Zapatista Thunder
Current History, March 1994
Mexico: Zapatista Thunder
Lucy CongerThe January uprising in Chiapas has galvanized Mexican
political thought and forced the country to face a
fundamental issue: "For decades, the conventional
wisdom about Mexico held that democratization...would
threaten political stability in a land with a fearsome
history of bloody uprisings. Today, democratization
seems the only guarantor of stability and peace." On January 11, 10 days after guerrillas calling themselves
the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) launched bold
attacks on five towns and an army barracks in the southern state
of Chiapas, television newscaster Jorge Ramos fired a pointed
question at a Mexican official. "Senor consul, is the government
concerned that in this election year people might want to vote for
an opposition party because it might bring peace instead of staying
with the ruling [Institutional Revolutionary] party (PRI), that has
brought war to the country?"
With that single question, Ramos put the PRI's much-touted
record of 65 years of social peace on the line. His question reflects
the severe credibility crisis at home and abroad for the
administration of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari that was
unleashed in two explosive weeks of fighting by the Zapatista
guerrillas. Salinas himself had achieved an image control with the
press that nearly matched that enjoyed by American President
Ronald Reagan in his heyday. But suddenly his grasp on events had
slipped. "Before, it was as though he was a type of king, or God,
who made no mistakes and all he touched ran marvelously, like a
magician. Now we know that was a very partial view. We focused
on the economic situation in general and lost sight of the social
question," noted Salinas sympathizer Susan Kaufman Purcell, the
vice president for Latin American affairs at the Americas Society.
In late January a worried Salinas scurried off to an
international financial community meeting in Davos, Switzerland,
seeking to reassure investors. His message was that the guerrilla
conflict was localized in Chiapas and that a political pact signed
just before the meeting would guarantee peaceful presidential and
congressional elections in August. Despite those calming words,
the Zapatista army, a predominantly indigenous force several
thousand strong, has moved the conflict beyond the Chiapas borders
by pushing its priorities to the top of the national agenda. In their
"Declaration of War," the guerrillas raised the social question by
demanding jobs, housing, health, and education for Mexico's
impoverished indigenous peoples, and made an unequivocal demand
for honest elections this year. They have created a new imperative
for democratic reforms in Mexico that will make the August
presidential race the most contentious ever and holds out the
possibility of ending the nearly seven decades of continuous rule by
the PRI.
It remains to be seen whether Mexico can stage clean
elections, but what is already clear since the Chiapas uprising is
that Salinas and his Institutional Revolutionary party are moving
faster toward political reform than in the previous five years of
his administration. The crisis exposed the lack of political
sensibility among Salinas's inner circle of technocrats. Salinas
initially responded with force, sending the army in to retake towns
held by the Zapatistas. Within days, the army was under attack in
the national and foreign press for alleged human rights violations,
including bombing of civilian areas, summary executions, and
torture. Ten days after the conflict broke out the Salinas
administration regained its balance and began moving aggressively
to recover the political initiative and press for the pacification of
the conflict. A key move was the appointment of Manuel Camacho,
the last remaining _politico_ in the Salinas camp, as peace
commissioner. The toppling of the hard-line interior minister and
the weak Chiapas interim governor and the announcement of a
unilateral army cease-fire reversed the initial military response
and made clear the government's intention of seeking a political
solution. The rebellion, which claimed as many as 400 lives in
initial fighting, brought tens of thousands of citizens out for
marches calling for a truce and peace talks. Opposition politicians
tried to capitalize on the popular demand for peace, and the
government benefited from the outcry against violence, which
helped isolate the armed movement. Within two weeks, the
government and the guerrillas had accepted Bishop Samuel Ruiz of
San Cristobal de las Casas, a longtime champion of the Chiapas
Indians, as a peace mediator, and one month after the fighting
began both sides had reached agreement about the conditions and
agendas for peace talks.
The new reality in Mexico was summarized in dramatic and
moving terms in a letter sent to the rebel army by 280
organizations belonging to the State Indigenous and Peasant
Council of Chiapas. "After a long night that appeared to have no end,
it took the Zapatista thunder to clear the darkness and aspire to
the future with a new light," they wrote in an endorsement of the
guerrillas' demands for freedom, justice, and democracy,
especially for Mexico's indigenous and peasant peoples. The changed
political landscape is evident in the new political actors that have
been moved into key leadership positions and are believed capable
of implementing meaningful political reform. And in an apparent
strategy shift, the guerrillas pledged they would "not impede" the
August presidential elections, holding out the prospect that the
vote could take place normally. But in the wake of the Chiapas
uprising, all of Mexico is asking: "What is normal now?"
CHIAPAS IS MEXICO
The violent uprising stunned officials and citizens alike, but
no one was surprised that the insurgency arose in Chiapas. Tucked
away in the far southeastern corner of the country, Chiapas was
part of Guatemala until it joined Mexico in 1824. Chiapas is
Mexico's poorest state, home to 1 million impoverished Indians who
eke out a spartan living as small farmers, day laborers, charcoal-
makers, and artisans. The legacy of centuries of malnutrition is
painfully obvious: most of the Indians are less than five feet tall.
More than 30 percent of the state's 3.2 million inhabitants are
illiterate, 32 percent speak only an Indian language, and 72 percent
of schoolchildren do not complete first grade. Although the state
produces 55 percent of Mexico's hydroelectric power, 34 percent of
homes have no electricity. The indigenous are the victims of
countless land disputes in which feudal land barons, known as
_caciques,_ send bands of armed men to evict Indians from their
lands. Violence is institutionalized through links between the
_caciques_ and local officials, who typically turn a deaf ear to the
land disputes and intimidate or jail priests and other advocates
who defend the Indians' land struggles. "The origins of the armed
movement of Chiapas are in actions that were stimulated by the
government," which for decades has ignored the Indians' claims for
land and justice, writes political columnist Miguel Angel Granados
Chapa in Mexico City's _Reforma_ newspaper. Curiously, the
highest voter support for the PRI in the 1988 election was won in
this state of poverty and discrimination where, according to
official election results, more than 90 percent of voters backed
the ruling party. But as political analyst Alberto Aziz Nassif has
noted, in Chiapas "thousands of votes [were] extracted by a
fraudulent administration of elections made by PRI."
Among government officials and financiers and businessmen,
it has become popular to refer to the Zapatista uprising as the
"Chiapas incident." While Chiapas may be physically isolated from
the rest of Mexico, and living conditions may be miserable in the
extreme, the state's problems now permeate national life. Many
Mexicans point to the hardships of life in Chiapas as emblematic of
what is wrong with Mexico's economic model, which has catapulted
11 men to billionaire status while confining 43 million Mexicans to
a life of poverty. "Chiapas es Mexico" is a new slogan born of the
crisis, and it is a bitter retort to the government's attempts to
defend its stringent economic policies that have lowered inflation,
sold off state-owned enterprises, and ended federal budget
deficits while failing to stimulate robust growth, create jobs, or
combat poverty.
It is telling that no one in government, from President
Salinas down, has questioned the legitimacy of the Zapatista army
demands for jobs and social programs as well as independence,
freedom, democracy, justice, and peace. PRI presidential contender
Luis Donaldo Colosio, who led the government's antipoverty
program before he was named the party's candidate, said that
social programs have been "insufficient to eradicate the ancestral
poverty" in Chiapas. The bitter conditions that fueled the Chiapas
uprising exist in many other regions in Mexico and afflict
indigenous groups that live in 27 of the country's 31 states, posing
the threat that unrest could spread.
Mexicans have taken the Chiapas crisis to heart. In 10 years
of reporting in Mexico, I have never seen friends and acquaintances
so shaken or moved. "It is clear to me that the [government's]
economic program benefits me, but morally it is not fair that my
indigenous countrymen are fighting for land," said one. Teachers
have stormed out of classrooms enraged with students who refuse
to admit to racism against Indians, and artists and scholars say
they cannot sleep and suffer nightmares because of the uprising.
"Chiapas has awakened a social conscience that was asleep because
we did not see the possibility of change," says Fernanda Navarro, a
philosophy professor at the Nicolaita University in Morelia,
Michoacan.
A DEMOCRATIC REFORM?
With pressure from the Zapatistas bearing down, two
important steps were taken in late January that could make the
presidential election credible and prevent bitter postelection
disputes that might turn violent. On January 27 Mexico's three
leading political parties and five of six small parties signed a
"Pact for Peace, Democracy, and Justice," saying that honest
elections acceptable to civil society and political parties are "a
necessary condition" for establishing a "just and durable peace." To
gain credibility for the elections, the eight parties pledged to
adopt measures that would promote clean elections and "establish
mechanisms that give full reliability to the voter registration
roll." Ever since the tainted 1988 presidential election, which
millions of Mexicans believe was won by opposition leader
Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, the voter rolls have been the focus of bitter
controversy. Leaders of the conservative National Action party
(PAN) and the liberal Democratic Revolution party (PRD) charge the
voter rolls are larded with names of dead people and riddled with
inaccuracies that prevent eligible voters from voting. Election
credibility will be enhanced by the appointment in January of Jorge
Carpizo, a respected jurist, as interior minister and final arbiter
of the balloting.
The pact also calls on the Zapatistas to put down their arms
and enter public life as a political force. Peace Commissioner
Manuel Camacho pressed this issue on the guerrillas by calling the
EZLN a "political force in formation" in a statement that outlined
his plan for peace negotiations. The pact recognizes the political
parties as the representative force on the question of democratic
reform, and aims to keep the issue of national democratization out
of the peace talks.
The agreement demonstrates movement toward political
reform, a topic that was taboo as recently as a few months ago.
The significance of the pact lies in its intention to negotiate
details and its acceptance of the principle of promoting a legal
reform that would set out stringent election procedures to
eliminate the present system of PRI control of election review
boards. The reform debate would also raise the sensitive issue of
accepting international election observers. Finally, the pact
recognizes the authenticity of opposition candidate Cuauhtemoc
Cardenas and the PRD. Through the pact, the government and the PRI
"have accepted that you can't have a clean election without a fuss
if Cardenas is not on board" and this grants Cardenas a kind of veto
power over reform measures, says political scientist Jorge G.
Castaneda. But others caution against a premature celebration of
the end of the state-party regime. They point to the desire of
Salinas and his group to retain control of the political system and
emphasize the key elements of political reform remain undefined.
"I prefer to see that which I do not desire: the regime does not
want to make true changes," writes historian Enrique Krauze.
Another important step toward democratization received a
new impetus from pressures created by the guerrilla uprising. On
January 26, PRI candidate Colosio pledged that he will support
clean elections and a program of 20 democratic reforms that are
being proposed to all presidential candidates by a nonpartisan
movement led by intellectuals, politicians, artists, and citizen
activists. Colosio's endorsement of the civil society document, "20
Pledges for Democracy," is significant because the reforms would
weaken the PRI's hold on power, reduce presidential powers, and
pave the way for a system of checks and balances by creating
greater independence in the legislative and judicial branches of
government.
A POSTMODERN GUERRILLA
The Zapatista National Liberation Army is unlike any other
Latin American guerrilla movement, and in its short public life has
shown a flexibility and moderation previously unknown in the
hemisphere. The Zapatistas distinguished their movement with
their ready willingness to engage in peace talks. Only one week
after taking up arms, the guerrilla leadership responded favorably
to government offers to hold a dialogue to debate the EZLN agenda
of social and economic demands, a cease-fire, and political
participation for indigenous and other citizens. Three weeks after
their initial attacks, the Zapatistas announced a major strategy
shift in a communique that reversed their initial demands for the
overthrow of Salinas and the army and pledged they "will not
impede the elections of 1994."
The Zapatistas launched their uprising in unusual times,
historian Lorenzo Meyer points out. "The EZLN [rebellion] is the
first postmodern rebellion of Latin America. The first that is born
not only in postcommunism but also, and this is important, [born] in
post-anticommunism," Meyer wrote in the newspaper _Excelsior._
In this context, the Zapatistas explicitly renounced the standard
leftist goals of leading revolution and taking power. "There are and
there will be other revolutionary organizations. We do not intend to
be the one, sole, and true historic vanguard," said an EZLN
communique published January 25. This sharply unorthodox
approach reflects a keen reading of the political climate by the
Zapatistas, who can maximize their impact by seizing the precise
moment for striking--the election year--and have now chosen to
join the growing clamor for honest elections and democratization,
analysts say.
The "public face" of the EZLN is SubComandante Marcos, a tall
man who wears a ski mask that reveals only his green eyes and
part of his prominent nose. The subcomandante, who spoke from
behind his mask to a dazed crowd of residents and tourists in the
plaza of San Cristobal de las Casas on New Year's Day, has captured
the popular imagination through the bold moves of the Zapatistas
and through a dozen communiques that reveal a direct, powerful
writing style and a sense of humor heretofore concealed by most
Latin American guerrillas. In a sharply worded communique that
warned the army it would have to kill every Zapatista to eradicate
the guerrilla command, the insurgent subcomandante fired a
potshot at Mexican insensitivity to the indigenous: "A question:
Will all of this serve so that at least the 'Mexicans' learn to say
'Chiapas' instead of 'Chapas' and say 'Tzeltales' instead of
'Setsales'?"
Public response to the guerrillas might be considered
postmodern also. The Zapatistas have rekindled the romanticism
classically associated with leftist movements, but have also
stirred deep fears of social unrest and sparked massive protests
renouncing the use of violence. Troubling questions hover over the
movement about the source of the rebels' money and weapons, and
the answers could shift public sentiment away from the
Zapatistas.
CONTINUITY AS LIABILITY
The guerrilla conflict eclipsed the presidential campaign,
which was officially kicked off in January. The Zapatista social
and political demands challenge all candidates to revamp their
rhetoric and platforms. PRI contender Luis Donaldo Colosio is under
the most pressure to reformulate his program. Colosio was chosen
as PRI candidate by Salinas because he best assured the continuity
of the Salinas economic reforms. But in the redefined Mexico,
continuity has become a political liability.
Doubts about the economic model that Colosio would carry
forward have deepened since Chiapas. The Salinas reforms that
privatized public companies, removed barriers to foreign
competition, and created federal budget surpluses also left nearly
half of all Mexicans living in poverty or extreme poverty. The
Solidaridad program of public works and targeted food subsidies,
which was run by Colosio, was created to alleviate the poverty
spread by the modernizing liberal reforms. Solidaridad projects
were to be a pillar of the PRI campaign. But once the spotlight of
national attention was trained on the extreme poverty of Chiapas--
which has received one of the highest levels of Solidarity funds--
the flaws of the antipoverty program became apparent. The dusty
Tzotzil Indian town of Chenalho, Chiapas, is a case in point. In the
past two years, Solidaridad came to Chenalho, financed
construction of a meeting hall for farmers, and built a public
bathhouse that smells from two blocks away. But no jobs were
created, and the local priest says farmers lack production credits.
Many of the Tzotziles of Chenalho scratch out a bare existence
growing corn and coffee on the steep hillsides above town; many
others are forced to emigrate to the adjoining states of Tabasco
and Oaxaca to get work in construction or other jobs. "They stay
away for two or three months and come back when they've earned
some money and go away again when they've spent it," Felipe
Abarca Villafuerte, a primary school teacher, told foreign
reporters.
The Colosio campaign got off to a lackluster start. On
February 1, he made a good effort to drape himself in the mantle of
justice. In a campaign speech at Ananecuilco, the birthplace of
revolutionary hero Emiliano Zapata, Colosio intoned, "The claim,
beliefs, and yearnings [of Zapata] are still in force; his call
demands a reply. The cry of 'Land and Liberty' is still today a
demand for justice, it is a condition for peace, for stability of the
country, and for prevailing over poverty." The candidate went on to
promise a new strategy of governing, but offered no compelling
details. The government's credibility crisis offers Colosio an
opportunity to strike out in new directions and create his own
identity and platform independent of Salinas. If he cannot meet the
challenge, his campaign may languish.
The presidential contest could face another earthquake
before the final deadline in July for registration of candidates. The
appointment of former Colosio rival Manuel Camacho as peace
commissioner has given him national prominence and popularity,
and has fueled widespread speculation that Camacho will launch
himself as a presidential contender. The former mayor of Mexico
City, Camacho was so bitterly disappointed when he lost the PRI
presidential nomination to Colosio that he staged an unorthodox
public protest and hinted he would leave government. Back in the
limelight and active in his preferred role as a protagonist, he
stands to win great popularity as the man who may restore
political stability. As peace talks began in February, Camacho
remained a wild card in the election. He still nurtures presidential
ambitions, but the scenarios for his candidacy are highly
problematic, and Salinas himself spoke out to re-endorse the
Colosio candidacy and quash the rumors that Camacho might
replace Colosio as PRI's presidential choice. Even if he ran on
another party's ticket, a Camacho candidacy would divide the PRI at
the very least. An important motive for Salinas's choice of Colosio
was the need to maintain unity in the PRI. Paradoxically, Camacho's
rehabilitation as peace commissioner has re-ignited his followers
and stirred up one of the most severe divisions the party has faced.
The leading opposition parties enter the election fray with
handicaps. The Democratic Revolution party is still struggling to
unify factions that range from socialists to PRI defectors, but its
internal divisions are not likely to detract votes from its
candidate, Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, who led the strongest challenge
ever against PRI in the jiggered 1988 election. The National Action
party has chosen as candidate Diego Fernandez de Cevallos, a man
who lacks a popular following, and it lost respected independent-
minded leaders last year in an internal dispute over the party's
cooperation with Salinas's policies. Both parties must compete
against the awesome PRI behemoth with its overpowering
economic resources and nationwide election machine. A deeper
problem for all the parties is the issue of representativity at a
time when Mexicans increasingly prefer to affiliate with
nonpartisan special interest groups--and when burgeoning civil
society has seized the initiative on many pressing issues such as
government accountability and human rights.
The strongest threat to Colosio is Cardenas, who drew 31
percent of the vote in 1988, according to official results. Cardenas
has tirelessly stumped the country for the past six years, and is
expected to make a strong showing once again. It would take
exceptional circumstances to bring about a Cardenas victory, but
exceptional circumstances are closer at hand than at almost any
time in PRI history. Cardenas's presidential bid could be boosted by
fractures in the PRI, resentment against the party's perpetual rule,
continuing economic hardships, unexpected fallout from the
Zapatista presence, and a direct appeal to a broad constituency,
including small political parties and nonpartisan civic groups.
THE NEW POLITICAL PLAYERS
As in other countries, new political forces are emerging in
Mexico that will be important players in the election. The struggle
to forge alliances across parties and with citizen groups is central
to the country's political reorganization. The discipline of
corporate groups and straight party voting are crumbling as part of
the shift toward democracy. The PRI still counts thousands of labor
and peasant organizations among its corporatist affiliates, but the
1988 election proved that their loyalty at the ballot box is
questionable. Cardenas has already lined up the backing of right-
wing Foro Democratico Nacional, a breakaway from the National
Action party, and several small socialist parties. Last July the
Democratic Revolution party endorsed a Cardenas initiative to
reserve up to 50 percent of its federal and state candidacies for
independents drawn from popular organizations, advocacy groups,
and prominent independent people respected for their leadership in
promoting democratic reforms.
On February 5, below the imposing arches of the Monument to
the Revolution in Mexico City, Cardenas announced the creation of
the National Democratic Alliance (ADN), a pluralistic coalition that
includes parties ranging across the political spectrum and scores
of local civic and labor organizations, and the Citizens Movement
for Democracy, a national coalition of 150 urban community
associations, peasant leagues, and ecology and human rights
groups. In its "Charter for Democratic Change," the ADN sets as its
goal an end to the "corporatist and authoritarian system" and the
election of a pluralist Congress that would draft a new
constitution and promote an equitable social policy; these would be
the pillars of a transition to democracy, says ADN organizer Joel
Ortega. The Alliance is an open movement aimed principally at
uniting civic associations and advocacy groups that can organize a
massive popular campaign to monitor the presidential election and
protest election fraud.
Skepticism about the possibility of clean elections runs deep
and wide. A recent opinion poll showed that 71 percent of
respondents expect the elections, which absent reforms will be
supervised by PRI-controlled agencies, to be dirty. Consequently,
citizen mobilization for honest elections could be the decisive
factor in setting up a credible vote and dampening protest over the
outcome. The validity of the election will depend heavily on "the
influential group of analysts and national and foreign citizen
groups that will monitor the process," writes Carlos Ramirez,
senior political columnist at Mexico City's _El_Financiero_
newspaper. The Zapatista army will also put pressure on the
elections, kindling the threat of electoral unrest if the official
vote count is cast in doubt.
The Zapatista movement has breathed new life into the
burgeoning civil society by giving an urgency to the insistent but
until now little-heard popular demands for fair elections,
government accountability, and citizen participation in a political
system dominated by presidential power and the PRI. But the
guerrilla uprising creates new imperatives if the community and
farmer associations, urban groups, and special interest advocates
that make up civil society are to retain credibility with the
majority of Mexicans who are poor. "Civil society now has the
word, but its agenda [had been] minimal and exclusively aimed at
the transition to democracy. Now, civil society must take on
simultaneously the struggle for justice, and for democracy," says
Miguel Alvarez, a member of the Citizens Movement for Democracy.
THE NOT SO ROSY ECONOMY
Complicating the political panorama for this year is the dull
economic outlook. The high expectations that Salinas stirred up in
selling the North American Free Trade Agreement (nafta),
which went into effect January 1, could prove elusive if investors
shy away from a troubled Mexico. Growth is expected to reach 3
percent--at most 3.5 percent--this year, an inadequate level for
Mexico, where the estimated 2.2 percent population growth rate
absorbs most economic expansion, and where UN agencies report
that annual growth of 6.7 percent is required to create enough jobs
to employ the growing labor force. NAFTA was a leading motive for
the Chiapas uprising, and was denounced resoundingly by the
Zapatistas for job losses it is expected to cause among Mexican
farmers likely to be displaced by imports of cheap United States
corn. In the short run, NAFTA's greater opening to foreign
competition could drive some Mexican industries out of business.
Unemployment has increased in the past two years, and more
Mexicans are expected to lose their jobs this year, swelling the
informal economy that some analysts say employs up to 25 percent
of working Mexicans. The Salinas opening has made Mexico highly
dependent on foreign investment to pay for a trade deficit that is
estimated to reach $18 billion in 1994. As in recent years, the
stock market is expected to turn in a positive performance during
the year, but as the Chiapas crisis painfully shows, growth in the
financial sector does not filter down to the needy. Now the
government is speeding up social spending and some say may slip
into a deficit.
Months before the uprising, Salinas had pledged to lighten the
austerity burden imposed on voters by the liberal economic reform.
The anti-inflation program for 1994 includes measures that would
reduce taxes and fuel costs for consumers and allow for real
increases in certain wage categories. Discontent among middle-
class professionals who see no prospect for economic advancement
is rampant, and they could become an important anti-PRI
constituency if the economy remains weak.
OF MASKED MEN AND MASKED TRUTHS
Mexico has a rich tradition of masked men leading popular
causes. Recently, SuperBarrio, a masked maverick who dresses like
the popular _lucha_libre_ wrestlers, was born out of the ashes of
the 1985 Mexico City earthquake. He defends the homeless in their
fight for housing aid and stands at the side of inner city renters
battling eviction. SubComandante Marcos now joins the gallery of
masked would-be reformers. His mask has become controversial as
peace negotiator Camacho has demanded that Marcos bare his face
at the peace talks. Marcos replied fiercely to the demand that he
take off his mask. "Why such a fuss over the ski mask? Is Mexican
political culture not the 'culture of the veiled?,'" he asked, alluding
to the traditional secrecy that shrouds the naming of PRI
presidential candidates. The subcomandante issued a challenge: "I
am willing to take off my ski mask if Mexican society will take off
its mask" and reexamine its images of "modernity" to reconcile the
third world that is Chiapas with Salinas's claims that Mexico is
entering the first world.
The subcomandante may remain masked, but the movement
that he leads is unmasking painful truths about Mexico. "The
rebellion uncovered the degree of simulation and lies in which we
live," exposing racism and the impossibility of "organizing a
modernization program against the people or [based on] their
ignorance," writes political commentator Jose Agustin Ortiz
Pinchetti in _La_Jornada_ newspaper. For decades, the state-party
system dominated by the PRI has been politely called "democracia a
la mexicana," a euphemism for a pluralistic political charade in
which the PRI holds nearly all the cards. As these and other masks
come off in Mexico, a new possibility comes into view: honest and
competitive elections that could create a pluralistic democracy.
The Chiapas crisis demonstrates an overwhelming popular
rejection of violence and potential resilience on both sides of the
conflict. Under the Salinas administration's technocrats, political
institutions may be creaking but they are not yet brittle. Salinas
again adopted bold moves characteristic of his leadership and
pushed for a peaceful solution to the conflict. The Zapatista
guerrillas made agile responses to proposals for negotiations, and
recognized that meeting their demands for justice will take time.
But the deadline for clean elections is fixed. For decades, the
conventional wisdom about Mexico held that democratization of the
state-party regime would threaten political stability in a land
with a fearsome history of bloody uprisings. Today,
democratization seems the only guarantor of stability and peace.
Lucy Conger, Mexico correspondent for _Institutional_
Investor_ magazine and _Jornal_do_Brasil_ newspaper, has reported
on Mexican politics and economics for the past 10 years. The author
thanks _Jornal_do_Brasil_ for granting permission to include
material published in the newspaper.
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